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Abstract. In spite of the availability of DNSSEC, which protects against
cache poisoning even by MitM attackers, many caching DNS resolvers
still rely for their security against poisoning on merely validating that
DNS responses contain some ‘unpredictable’ values, copied from the re-
quest. These values include the 16 bit identifier field, and other fields,
randomised and validated by different ‘patches’ to DNS. We investigate
the prominent patches, and show how attackers can circumvent all of
them, namely:
– We show how attackers can circumvent source port randomisation,
in the (common) case where the resolver connects to the Internet via
different NAT devices.
– We show how attackers can circumvent IP address randomisation,
using some (standard-conforming) resolvers.
– We show how attackers can circumvent query randomisation, includ-
ing both randomisation by prepending a random nonce and case
randomisation (0x20 encoding).
We present countermeasures preventing our attacks; however, we believe
that our attacks provide additional motivation for adoption of DNSSEC
(or other MitM-secure defenses).
Keywords: DNS security, DNS poisoning, Network Address Translator,
NAT, DNS server selection, network security, Internet security.
1 Introduction
Correct and efficient operation of the Domain Name System (DNS) is essential
for the operation of the Internet. However, there is a long history of vulner-
abilities and exploits related to DNS, mostly focusing on DNS poisoning. In a
poisoning attempt the attacker causes recursive DNS servers (resolvers) to cache
an incorrect, fake DNS record, e.g., mapping VIC-Bank.com to an IP address con-
trolled by the attacker. DNS poisoning can facilitate many other attacks, such as
injection of malware, phishing, website hijacking/defacing and denial of service.
The main technique for DNS poisoning is by sending forged responses to
DNS requests which were sent by resolvers; to foil this, resolvers validate re-
sponses using different mechanisms. Currently, most resolvers rely only on non-
cryptographic validation, mainly, validating that the response echoes some un-
predictable (random) values sent with the request, such as in the DNS ID field,
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the client port, or within the resource (domain) name; e.g., see RFC 5452 [1].
Obviously, such mechanisms are insecure against a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM)
attacker, who can read the randomness from the request and send a fake response
with the valid identifiers.
Furthermore, even a weaker - and more common - off-path, spoofing attackers,
may be able to send valid DNS responses and cause DNS poisoning, when the
validated values are predictable or limited. For example, some DNS implementa-
tions use predictable identifiers (sequential, or using a weak pseudorandom gen-
erator); e.g., in [2], Klein shows how to predict the identifier for the then-current
version of Bind 9, a widely-used DNS server, and how this can be exploited for
highly-efficient DNS poisoning by a spoofing attacker. Indeed, as pointed out
already in 1995 by Vixie [3], the identifier field alone is simply too short (16
bits) to provide sufficient defense against a determined spoofing attacker, who
can foil it by sending many (but not too many) fake responses.
To improve DNS security, the IETF published DNSSEC [4,5,6], an extension
to DNS, using cryptography (signatures and hashing) to ensure security (even)
against MitM attackers. However, in spite of the publication of DNSSEC already
in 1997 [7], and the wide awareness to its existence, deployment is still limited
- e.g., less than 2% as reported in [8] for April, 2012. There are also many
caching DNS resolvers that still do not support, or do not perform validation
of, DNSSEC [9]; we discuss the deployment status of DNSSEC in Appendix B.
Furthermore, due to implementation errors DNSSEC protection may fail, even
when both the resolver and zone deploy it: validation of signatures of important
top level domains, e.g., mil, fails since the root does not delegate the public
signature key of mil but instead provides an incorrect indication that mil does
not support DNSSEC. This results in resolvers falling back to a non-validating
mode.
Indeed the deployment of DNSSEC is progressing slowly, due to challenges
(see [10]), and possibly due to the recent improvements (‘patches’) to non-
cryptographic defenses, causing ‘if it ain’t broke, dont´ fix it’ response. These
patches are mainly by deploying new sources of ‘unpredictability’ in DNS re-
quests and responses, such as use of random source ports [11,12], random DNS
server selection [1] and random capitalisation of the domain name [13].
This manuscript focuses on relying on such non-cryptographic ‘patches’ to
defend against DNS poisoning. This has two goals: to help improve these patches,
since evidently they will remain widely used for years; and to further motivate
adoption of more secure solutions such as DNSSEC, by pointing out weaknesses
in the patches. While these specific weaknesses can be fixed (and we show how
- often, easily), their existence should motivate the adoption of better security
measures such as DNSSEC, providing security against MitM attacker and allow-
ing for better validation of security, e.g., see [14].
1.1 Patching Caching DNS Resolvers Against Poisoning
Many researchers have identified vulnerabilities in the approach of relying on
an ‘unpredictability’ of some fields in a DNS request and proposed patches;
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we next review some of the main results. Bernstein, [15], suggested to improve
DNS’s defense against spoofed responses by sending the request from a random
port, which can add a significant amount of entropy1. To prevent birthday at-
tack, where attacker causes resolver to issue multiple queries for same domain in
order to increase the probability of a match with one of multiple fake responses,
Bernstein [15] and others suggest to limit the maximal number of concurrent
requests for the same resource record (to one or to some small number); this
technique is usually referred to as the birthday protection.
Many implementations did not implement these suggestions till the recent
Kaminsky attack, [11,12], which introduced two critical improvements, allowing
devastating attacks on many Internet applications. The first improvement was
to control the time at which the resolver sends queries (to which the attacker
wishes to respond), by sending to the resolver queries for a non-existing host
name, e.g., with a random or sequential prefix of the domain name. The second
improvement was to add, in the spoofed responses sent to the resolver, a type NS
DNS record (specifying a new name for the domain name server) and/or a type
A ‘glue’ DNS record (specifying the IP address of that domain’s name server).
These records poison the resolver’s entries for the victim name server. Hence, if
the attack succeeds once (for one record), the adversary controls the entire name
space of the victim.
As a result of Kaminsky’s attack, it became obvious that changes were needed
to prevent DNS poisoning. Indeed, major DNS resolvers were quickly patched.
The most basic patches were known measures - source port randomisation and
birthday protection (see above).
These and other additional patches were summarised in RFC 5452 [1], in-
cluding the use of random (valid) IP addresses for the name server. Additional
patches, implemented by some resolvers, are to randomise DNS queries by ran-
domly ‘case toggling’ the domain name (0x20 encoding [13]), or by adding a
random prefix to the domain name [16]. It is tempting to interpret the anal-
ysis in [13,17,1,16] as indication that the ‘patches’ may suffice to make poi-
soning impractical, reducing the motivation for deployment of more systematic
improvements. However, we caution against this conclusion. This work shows
that in common scenarios, attackers can often circumvent some or all of the
‘patches’, making it still feasible to poison resolvers that rely on validation of
‘unpredictable’ values copied from requests to responses (rather than relying on
cryptographic security, as in DNSSEC).
Some concerns with ‘patches’ were presented in earlier works. In particular,
the most widely and easily deployed ‘patch’ is clearly source port randomisation.
However, security experts, e.g., [18,12], noted that DNS resolvers located behind
firewall/NAT devices, that use sequential assignment of external ports, were still
vulnerable to the poisoning attack. On the other hand, it was widely believed
that ‘port-randomising’ NAT devices, that sufficiently randomise the external
ports, could retain or even improve the defense against DNS cache poisoning,
1 The exact amount of entropy added depends on the number of available ports, which
may be below 216.
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e.g., see [12]. In addition, it was believed that ‘port-preserving’ NAT devices,
that leave the source port intact (if it were not already allocated to another
host), can be safely used with port-randomising resolvers, e.g., see [19]. Our
results show otherwise, i.e., some of our attacks show how to circumvent port
randomisation, in the resolver-behind-NAT scenario, even for port-randomising
and port-preserving NATs.
Note that the resolver-behind-NAT scenario is common [20,21]. A recent
study, [9], of DNSSEC deployment by recursive resolvers observed that a large
number of recursive DNS resolvers is located behind NAT devices, and often
many resolvers are even behind the same NAT device. Furthermore, [22] found
that 90% out of 20,000 DSL lines (from a major European ISP) were located
behind a NAT device.
1.2 Attacker Model
In our attacks, we assume an off-path, spoofing adversary connected to the In-
ternet and a non-spoofing (user-mode) compromised host (zombie) on the local
network; such zombies exist in many networks, e.g., see [23]; the attacker model
is depicted in Figure 5, in the Appendix. The zombie can open user mode sock-
ets and can send arbitrary (non-spoofed) packets, [24]. Alternately, the attacker
can poison a DNS resolver which provides open recursion services.
Note that, in many scenarios, attackers do not even need to infiltrate malware
to be able to control a host inside a local area network, e.g., attackers can obtain
legitimate temporary access to organisational or other networks, or can connect
to wireless networks as a legitimate client.
1.3 Our Contributions
The security of patched DNS resolvers relies on the randomness provided by the
validation fields. We show that it is possible to reduce and often to nullify the
randomness, thereby exposing the resolvers to Kaminsky style poisoning attacks.
Our attacks apply to all widely-deployed ‘patches’:
source-port randomisation. We expose vulnerabilities in common source
ports allocation algorithms, used by popular NAT devices; see Section 2. The
vulnerabilities allow to predict the source port allocated to queries of the resolver.
We tested our attacks in a lab setting against several NAT devices, see Table 1.
The type of the NAT that the resolver resides behind is important in deciding
which attack to launch.
DNS server IP randomisation. We present techniques to predict (or force)
the IP address of the name server to which the resolver will send its DNS request,
see Section 3. Our techniques rely on fragmented DNS responses.
domain name randomisation. We further show that randomisation of DNS
queries via 0x20 or by prepending a random string is not always effective and
does not introduce protection against poisoning attacks; see Section 4.
In addition to presenting the vulnerabilities, we also propose countermeasures;
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however, our most important contribution may be in motivating the adoption of
systematic, secure defenses against poisoning, such as DNSSEC.
2 Source Port (de)Randomisation
In this section we show techniques to trap/predict the external port that will
be allocated by the NAT device to the DNS request of the DNS resolver which
the attacker wishes to poison. This phase allows to reduce (or nullify in some
cases) the randomness added by source port randomisation of DNS resolvers.
We tested popular NAT implementations, Table 1, that support different port
allocation algorithms.
We identified the following common ports allocation algorithms: (1) ran-
dom allocation (Section 2.1) where NAT selects ports at random from a pool
of available ports until all ports are exhausted; (2) per-destination sequential
(Section 2.2) where the NAT selects random port to each destination, and sub-
sequent packets to that destination are allocated consecutive mappings; (3) port
preserving (Appendix A), where NAT preserves the original port in the outgoing
packet, and allocates sequentially upon collision; (4) restricted random alloca-
tion, where NAT maintains a mapping table that is smaller than the pool of
available ports.
We also checked the source port allocation process of the NAT devices, which
we tested in this work, via the DNS-OARC online porttest tool, [25]. The tool
assigns one of the possible three scores: great, good and poor, rating the ‘un-
predictability’ of the ports allocation process. The tool reported a great score
for all NAT devices (except VMware NAT which allocates sequentially incre-
mental ports). Yet, in this work we present techniques that allow the attacker
to trap/predict the ports assigned to resolvers’ DNS requests. The conclusion
is that ports that ‘appear’ to be random should not be taken as indication of
security. Indeed, as we show in this work, there are ways to circumvent this line
of defense.
In what follows we show trap-then-poison (Section 2.1) and predict-then-
poison (Section 2.2 and Appendix A) attacks for selected NAT devices; attacks
for other NAT devices in Table 1 apply with slight variations and can be found
in the extended version of this work [10]. Our descriptions and figures use illus-
trative choices of IP addresses, e.g., 10.6.6.6 (for zombie), 6.6.6.6 (for spoofing
adversary, nicknamed Eve), 1.2.3.4 (for the authoritative name server of the ‘vic-
tim’ domain, V.com), and so on.
In all attacks, we exploit the fact that the NAT allocates mappings (permu-
tations) between the addressing used by the internal host, identified by the ‘pair’
< SIP : SPort, DIP : DPort >, and the addressing used by the external host,
identified by the ‘pair’ < NATIP : NATPort,DIP : DPort >, with the same
values of DIP : DPort in both pairs. We denote such mappings (permutations) by
functions, e.g., f(·), g(·). In our description of the attacks, we assume ‘patched’
DNS resolvers, that select unpredictable (‘random’) transaction ID and source
port for each outgoing DNS request.
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Vendor Port Allocation Attack
Checkpoint (R70/FW-1) restricted random resistant to attacks
(cannot be trapped) in Section 2
Linux Netfilter Iptables per-dest first random Section 2.2
(kernel 2.6) with ‘–random’ then sequential Predict attack
Linux Netfilter Iptables preserving Section A
(kernel 2.6) (sequential if collide) Predict attack
VMware NAT (WS 6.5.2) incremental Kaminsky attack, [11]
Windows XP ICS first random Section 2.2
(Service Pack 3) then sequential Predict attack
Windows XP WinGate preserving Section 2
(Release 2.6.4) (random if collide) Trap attacks
CISCO IOS (release 15) preserving Section 2
(random if collide) Trap attacks
CISCO ASA (release 5500) random Section 2
(can be trapped) Trap attacks
Table 1. Summary of the source port derandomisation attacks presented in this work, against
different types of NAT devices that were tested.
Our attacks begin with a phase which allows the spoofer, Eve, to learn the
port that will be allocated by the NAT to the DNS request of the DNS resolver.
The port learning phase is performed with the help of a non-spoofing zombie,
running user mode privileges.
2.1 Trap-then-Poison for Random Ports Allocation
The attack in this section relies on the fact that the NAT implements outbound
refresh mapping for UDP connections, as specified in requirement 6 of RFC 4787
[26] (and implemented in most NATs). Namely, the NAT maintains the mappings
from an internal (source) SIP : Sport pair to an external port Eport, for TMR
seconds since a packet was last sent from SIP : Sport (in the internal side of
the NAT) to the external network, using this mapping. We further assume that
the NAT device selects an external port at random for each outgoing packet,
e.g., CISCO ASA. The NAT device silently drops outgoing packets, sent from
SIP : Sport to DIP : Dport, when all external ports for DIP : Dport are currently
mapped to other sources; this is the typical expected NAT behaviour [26].
The attack begins when the zombie contacts the attacker’s command-and-
control center, identifies its location, and receives signal to begin the attack.
We next describe the steps of the attack; also illustrated with simplifications in
Appendix, Figure 6.
1. The zombie, at address 10.6.6.6, sends UDP packets to 1.2.3.4:53, i.e.,
to the DNS port (53) of the name server of the ‘victim’ domain, whose FQDN
is ns.V.com, from each of the P ports in the set Ports. To handle faults, the
payload of each packet contains the sending port p ∈ Ports. Whenever the NAT
receives one of these packets, it forwards it to ns.V.com, using some ‘random’
permutation f over Ports; the allocation of each external port f(p) to a specific
internal port p is held for TMR seconds, unless refreshed. Since none of these
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packets is a legitimate DNS packet, the authoritative name server ns.V.com ig-
nores all of them, and does not send back any response.
2. After step 1 completed2, Eve sends a packet with a spoofed source ad-
dress 1.2.3.4:53, to external port 666 of the NAT (i.e., to 7.7.7.7:666). Since
7.7.7.7:666 is currently mapped to the internal IP address 10.6.6.6 and some
port f−1(666), the NAT relays the packet to this IP and port. Thereby, the zom-
bie learns the mapping of external port 666 to the internal port f−1(666); this
will be crucial in the continuation of the attack, where we ‘force’ the query of
the resolver to be sent using external port 666 (the ‘trap’). This packet contains
as a payload a random string of 8 or so digits to be used as the prefix of the
FQDN in the query sent in the attack (in step 4).
3. After receipt of the packet on port f−1(666) in step 2, the zombie waits
until the mappings established in step 1 are about to expire, i.e., until t3 =
t1 + TMR (where t1 is the time of step 1). At t3, the zombie sends additional
empty UDP packets, to all ports in Ports, except port f−1(666). As a result, the
NAT refreshes the mappings on all of these ports; only the mapping for port
666 times out, and hence this becomes the trap: i.e., the only available external
port of the NAT, which can be allocated for UDP packets whose destination is
1.2.3.4 : 53.
4. After step 3 completes, the attacker knows that the external port 666 of
the NAT is the only port which can be allocated to the UDP packets sent from
the internal network to the authoritative name server, at IP 1.2.3.4 : 53. The
zombie sends a single DNS query to the resolver, for a random FQDN r.V.com;
the use of a random ‘subdomain’ r ensures that the resolver will have to issue
a DNS query for this FQDN, since it surely will not have a cached value of
the mapping. The resolver then sends a query to ns.V.com, from some ‘random’
(more precisely, unpredictable to attacker) port which we denote p, and using
some random identifier i.
5. Next, at step 5, Eve sends a forged response per each i ∈ 216 values of
the ID field. If one of these responses matches all of the validation fields in the
query, the resolver will accept the poisoned records r.V.com A 6.6.6.6 and V.com
NS r.V.com. Namely, from this point on, the resolver will consider 6.6.6.6 as a
valid IP address for the authoritative DNS server of ns.V.com. The resolver will
also forward the response r.V.com A 6.6.6.6 to the zombie, which will detect the
successful attack, and inform Eve (this phase is not shown in the figure).
6. In step 6, the resolver receives the legitimate ‘non-existing domain’ (NX-
DOMAIN) response from the ‘real’ name server, at 1.2.3.4. If the attack suc-
ceeded, then this response is ignored, since the query is not pending any more.
Otherwise, the resolver forwards the NXDOMAIN response to the zombie, who
will inform Eve; they will repeat the attack from step 1 (as soon as ports expire
on the NAT).
7. Finally, steps 7 and 8 illustrate subsequent poisoning of ‘real’ FQDN within
the V.com domain. Since, following step 5, the resolver uses the ‘poisoned’ map-
2 Eve can learn it is time to send the packet at the beginning of step 2, e.g., by an
appropriate packet from the zombie to Eve upon completion of step 1.
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pings ns.V.com A 6.6.6.6, all subsequent requests for this domain are sent to
6.6.6.6.
2.2 Predict-then-Poison for Per-Destination Sequential Ports
In practice, due to efficiency considerations, NAT devices often do not select a
random external port for every outgoing packet, but, depending on the NAT de-
vice, select the first port (for a tuple defined by < SIP : SPort, DIP : DPort, protocol >)
at random, and subsequent ports are increased sequentially (for that tuple), un-
til NAT refreshes its mapping for that tuple (if no packets arrived, e.g., after 30
seconds). For a different tuple, e.g., different destination IP, a new random port
is selected for first packet, while subsequent packets are assigned sequentially
increasing port numbers. When the NAT refreshes the mapping, i.e., by default
30 seconds, the port for outgoing packets with destination IP and port tuple
is selected at random again. This behaviour is consistent with prominent NAT
devices, e.g., Iptables NAT, Carrier Grade NAT [27].
In this section we present predict-then-poison attack on a per-destination
port randomising NAT. A variation of the attack, which applies to port preserv-
ing NAT, appears in Appendix, Section A. In contrast to ‘trap’ attacks, the
‘predict’ attacks exploit an insufficient source port randomisation mechanism of
the NAT, which allows to produce much more efficient attacks by predicting
the source port allocated for the DNS requests by the NAT. In particular, the
zombie is only required to generate and send three packets during the attack:
first packet creates a mapping in the NAT table (so that packets from Eve can
come through), subsequent packet lets Eve know which external port was used
by the NAT, and the third packet is a DNS query which the zombie sends to
local resolver for some random name in the victim domain r.V.com. The attack
can be optimised by having the zombie transmit k packets (1 ≤ k ≤ 216) from
consecutive ports; Eve then sends
⌊
P
k
⌋
packets, such that j-th packet is sent to
port j · k. Typically, it may be preferable for zombie to issue less packets (i.e.,
to use smaller k) to evade detection. The steps of the attack (in Figure 1) are
described next.
1. Zombie opens the ports (to the destination IP address of the authoritative
DNS). Specifically the zombie at address 10.6.6.6 sends k UDP packets from se-
quentially increasing ports Ports[1],...,Ports[k− 1]. All k packets have 1.2.3.4:53
as the destination IP address and UDP port respectively (i.e., the name server of
the victim domain, whose FQDN is ns.V.com). When the NAT receives the first
packet (in the sequence of k packets that were sent), it selects the first external
port x at random, the rest of k − 1 packets are assigned consecutive (sequen-
tially increasing) external ports. The NAT sends these k packets to ns.V.com.
The authoritative DNS ns.V.com ignores those UDP packets, since they do not
constitute valid DNS requests.
2. Eve sends
⌊
P
k
⌋
UDP packets, to sequentially increasing (by a factor of
k) external ports of the NAT, with spoofed source IP 1.2.3.4:53. The payload
of each packet contains the destination port number. The zombie will receive
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Fig. 1. Predict-then-poison DNS attack, for configuration in Figure 5, assuming per-destination
port sequential NAT. The zombie sends a UDP packet to authoritative DNS ns.V.com, and queries
the local resolver for the FQDN in the domain of the ns.V.com. Since the destination of the DNS
request of the resolver is the same as the one used in the packet of the zombie, the NAT will not
select the port at random but will assign a consecutive external port. This port can be predicted by
Eve with the help of the zombie.
exactly one packet from Eve, w.l.o.g. on port i∗, and with payload containing
j∗ · k (i.e., packet that was sent to port j∗ · k of the NAT.
3. Next the zombie calculates the port that will be assigned by the NAT to
the DNS query of the local resolver: Ports[j∗ · k + (k − i∗) + 1], and sends it to
Eve in the payload (from some (random) source port Ports[$] to a destination
port 666, on which Eve is configured to be listening). Since the destination IP
address of the packet sent to Eve is different from that of the authoritative name
server, NAT will select an external port at random, and not consecutively, i.e.,
some Ports[$] s.t., with high probability Ports[$]6=Ports[x + k + 1].
4. The zombie then issues a DNS query to the local resolver, asking for a ran-
dom FQDN r.V.com. Since this domain name most likely does not exist in the
cache, the resolver will send a DNS query from some (random) port Ports[d] con-
taining a random identifier, to the authoritative name server ns.V.com. Note
that the destination in the query of the local resolver is the same as the one
that was used in the UDP packets of the zombie (i.e., the authoritative name
server), the NAT will allocate the next available (consecutive) port, i.e., port
Ports[x + k + 1], (to the query of the resolver), following the sequence of ports
assigned to the packets of zombie.
5. As soon as Eve receives the packet containing the external port of the
NAT that is mapped to the internal port of the resolver, she will generate and
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transmit P packets with different values in the ID field, with spoofed source IP
address (ostensibly originating from ns.V.com). The destination port in all the
packets is Ports[j∗ · k + (k − i∗) + 1], and the answer field contains: r.V.com A
6.6.6.6 and V.com NS r.V.com. Since this port was allocated by the NAT to
the query sent by the resolver, the NAT will forward all these DNS responses to
the resolver.
6. Eventually when the authentic response ‘non-existing domain’ (NXDO-
MAIN) of the real name server at 1.2.3.4 arrives, the resolver will ignore it if
one of the maliciously crafted packets (sent by Eve) matched and was accepted.
The remaining steps are identical to the steps (7) and (8), presented in Sec-
tion 2.1, Figure 6.
2.3 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we describe the setting that we used for validation of our attacks.
We also summarise, in Table 1, our results for each NAT device against which we
tested the attacks; the NAT devices were selected from different categories, i.e.,
proprietary NAT devices, e.g., Checkpoint, SOHO NAT devices, e.g., windows
XP ICS, and other prominent NAT devices. This list of NAT devices that we
tested is of course not exhaustive, but since we found that almost all of them,
except one, allowed the attacker to reduce source port randomisation of the
resolver, it is very likely that many more may be vulnerable to our (or other)
attacks, e.g., Carrier Grade NAT of Juniper Networks (based on the technical
report, [27], published in 2011).
Testbed Setup. Figure 5 illustrates the testbed used for the experimental
evaluation of our attacks. The testbed consists of a NAT enabled gateway, which
has two network cards. One card is connected via an ethernet cable to a switch,
connecting a benign client, a compromised host, and a DNS resolver. The other
is connected to Eve (also via a switch). The DNS resolver is running Unbound
1.4.1 software. The tests were run concurrently with other benign uses of the
network, e.g., web browsing3. We used raw sockets to transmit the spoofed UDP
packets sent by external spoofer Eve and user-level socket to transmit the UDP
packets from zombie to Eve. We report on the results of the success of the DNS
cache poisoning by running trap and predict attacks against several NAT devices
in Table 1, and in more detail in the technical report [10].
2.4 Improved Port Allocation Mechanism
Official recommendations, [28], for NAT behaviour do not specify the instructions
for the implementation of port allocation mechanism, as a result the develop-
ers and designers of NAT devices follow different approaches which may seem
secure. Based on our findings we identify two design factors in ports allocation
3 Note that the TCP traffic, which constitutes the majority on the Internet, does
not impact our attacks, since the NAT uses the protocol field in IP header when
allocating external ports.
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mechanism of the NAT: (1) the process via which the ports are selected (i.e.,
random, preserving, sequential); (2) the mapping table which maintains the al-
located ports.
Randomise Ports Selection. Use port randomisation, but either with sepa-
rate, random external port for each internal port, or at least with pseudo-random
(but not sequential) increments between external port numbers4. Random ports
assignment prevents the ‘predict’ attacks.
Restricted Mapping Table. The mapping table of allocated ports, main-
tained by the NAT, should be smaller than the pool of all the ports5, e.g., half
or less of the total of number of ports; a smaller mapping table prevents the
attacker from trapping the port. For each arriving packet NAT should randomly
select and assign a port from the pool of ports. Each time an entry is removed
from the table when the external port is freed, e.g., the entry is refreshed after
a timeout, NAT should select a new random port from the pool of ports.
3 IP Addresses (de)Randomisation
DNS resolvers can increase the entropy in DNS requests by randomising the
IP addresses, i.e., selecting the source/destination IP addresses in the DNS re-
quest at random, and then validating the same addresses in the DNS response.
Selecting random source IP address is rare, the resolvers are typically allocated
1234567891011121314
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Fig. 2. The number of IP addresses in use by Top
Level Domains (TLDs).
one (or few) IP address as IPv4 ad-
dresses are a scarce resource. Further-
more, resolvers behind NAT devices
use the IP of the NAT for their re-
quests, and the address of the resolver
is generally known [1].
In contrast, most operators of
DNS zones use a number of authori-
tative name servers for performance,
robustness, and enhanced resilience
to cache poisoning attacks. We found
that the majority of top level domains
(TLDs) use 5 to 7 authority name servers, and important domains, e.g., com,
use 13 authority servers6; see Figure 2.
When zone operators employ multiple authority servers, the resolver should
send the query to the one with the shortest response time, and avoid querying
non-responsive name servers, see [30,31]. However, there are no instructions on
how to implement the server selection algorithm; as a result different resolvers,
4 A pseudo-random permutation will provide as efficient data structure and lookup,
as when using sequential allocation.
5 This approach was supported only by the Checkpoint NAT which allowed it to evade
our trap attacks.
6 The list of TLDs is taken from the list published by IANA [29].
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and even different versions thereof, implement different server selection algo-
rithms, often resulting in inefficient implementations, [32].
Indeed, the selection of the authority server by the caching resolver can often
be predicted, e.g., if the attacker can measure the latency from the resolver to
the authority name servers for a sufficient amount of time. However, this requires
a significant effort from the attacker, and further may not result in precise pre-
diction.
We focus on a weaker attacker which does not keep track of the latency to
all the servers. However, our technique enables the attacker to predict the target
name server’s IP, for resolvers which avoid querying unresponsive name servers,
as per the recommendations in [31,32]. We exploit the fact that when the target
name server is not responsive, i.e., queries time-out, the resolver does not send
subsequent queries to it, but only periodically, probes the target server until it
becomes responsive. The (standard-conforming) Unbound (1.4.1) resolver sets
this probing interval to 15 minutes. A similar behaviour was observed by [32] in
PowerDNS, with the exception that PowerDNS sets the interval to 3 minutes. It
appears that relying on the DNS server IP address randomisation for additional
entropy requires careful study of particular resolver in question.
3.1 Predicting the Destination IP Address
The idea of destination IP prediction phase, in Figure 3, is to exploit large
DNS responses which result in fragmentation; name servers that use TCP when
responses exceed some predefined size, e.g., com, are not susceptible to this
attack. We performed the attack against a 404.gov domain7, whose non-existing
domain responses exceed 1500 bytes and thus get fragmented en-route.
This phase, of forcing the resolver to use a specific IP, requires a puppet, i.e.,
a script confined in a browser, which issues DNS requests via the local caching
DNS resolver, at IP 1.2.3.4 in Figure 3.
In steps 1 and 2 the puppet coordinates with the spoofer and issues a DNS
request for $123.404.gov (where $123 is a random prefix). In steps 3 and 4,
the spoofer sends a forged second fragment, for all the possible name servers
(i.e., a total of 2 spoofed fragments) except one which the attacker wants the
resolver to use for its queries during the poisoning phase; the 404.gov domain
has three name servers. This ensures that only one IP address will result in a valid
response, and the other two result in a malformed DNS packets. The spoofed
second fragment is incorrect, and contains a single arbitrary byte (in addition
to headers). In step 5, the spoofed second fragment is reconstructed with the
authentic first fragment resulting in a malformed DNS packet which leaves the
fragments reassembly buffer. This malformed DNS response is then discarded
by the resolver, and the IP of the name server is marked8 as ‘non-responsive’.
7 Many other zones return responses which get fragmented, e.g., mil TLD; we focused
on 404.gov since it has only three name servers, which simplifies the presentation.
8 In reality the resolver marks the server as ‘non-responsive’ after two unsuccessful re-
spopnses, and this is easily handled by the attacker by sending two spoofed fragments
with consecutive IP-ID in IP headers.
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When the authentic second fragment arrives, it does not have a match and is
discarded after a timeout. As a result the resolver does not receive the response,
and after a timeout it resends the DNS request to the next DNS server, step 6.
The same procedure applies here, and the response is discarded. In step 9 a valid
response arrives from IP 162.138.183.11. In a real attack the resolver sends two
queries to each server and marks the name server as non-responsive when two
queries to that server result in a timeout; for simplicity in Figure 3 we present
the process for one query to each server. This way, by wrecking the responses
from all name servers except one, we forced the resolver to direct all its queries
for 404.gov domain to 162.138.183.11.
Note that crafting a forged second fragment that would get matched with the
SrcIP:162.138.191.11 dstIP:1.2.3.4 
IP-ID: 777 Offset:0
SrcIP: 162.138.191.11 dstIP:1.2.3.4 
IP-ID: 777 Offset: 1480
2
Spoofer
6.6.6.6
Spoofer
6.6.6.6
Recursive
DNS resolver
1.2.3.4
Recursive
DNS resolver
1.2.3.4
Puppet
1.2.3.6
Puppet
1.2.3.6
A?$123.404.GOV
1
Attack initiated
3
SrcIP:162.138.191.11 dstIP:1.2.3.4 
IP-ID: 777 Offset:1480
Does not have a match
thus can not be reassembled.
Discarded after 
30 seconds
Reassembled with 
attacker's fragment
(sent in step 3).
5
Name Server
falcon.sec.GOV
162.138.191.11
Name Server
falcon.sec.GOV
162.138.191.11
Name Server
puffin.sec.GOV
162.138.191.23
Name Server
puffin.sec.GOV
162.138.191.23
SrcIP:162.138.191.23 dstIP:1.2.3.4 
IP-ID: 888 Offset:0
SrcIP: 162.138.191.23 dstIP:1.2.3.4 
IP-ID: 888 Offset: 1480
4
SrcIP:162.138.191.23 dstIP:1.2.3.4 
IP-ID: 888 Offset:1480
7
A?$123.404.GOV
A?$123.404.GOV
Name Server
crow.sec.GOV
162.138.183.11
Name Server
crow.sec.GOV
162.138.183.11
6
Malformed DNS 
response discarded by 
resolver. Server marked as
non-responsive. Query resent 
to next server.
Reassembled with 
attacker's fragment
(sent in step 4).
A?$123.404.GOV
8
9
SrcIP:162.138.183.11 dstIP:1.2.3.4 
IP-ID: 555 Offset:0
SrcIP:162.138.183.11 dstIP:1.2.3.4 
IP-ID: 555 Offset:1480
Malformed DNS response 
discarded by resolver. Server 
marked as non-responsive . 
Query resent to next server.
Response correct. During 
next15 minutes queries are
sent to that server.
Does not have a match
thus can not be reassembled.
Discarded after 
30 seconds
Fig. 3. The destination IP address prediction attacks: spoofing attacker crafts a forged second
fragment that gets reassembled with the authentic first fragment and results in a malformed packet,
which is discarded by the resolver.
authentic first fragment requires a match with the identification field (IP-ID) in
the IP header. According to [33,34] the fragments of a datagram are associated
with each other by their protocol number, the value in their IP-ID field, and
by the source/destination address pair. Therefore the attacker is required to hit
the correct IP-ID value, which is used by the name server in its DNS response.
Many domains, as well as 404.gov, use per-destination sequential incrementing
IP-ID values (or even globally sequential incrementing IP-ID, e.g., Windows OS).
Other domains (mainly top level domains and the root servers) increment the
IP-ID value in randomised quotas; we provide more details on this in [10].
The IP-ID allocation algorithm does not have a significant impact9 on our
attacks against Unbound (and alike) resolvers, as the number of ‘misses’, i.e.,
valid responses arriving to the resolver from some IP, does not prevent the attack
and two failed (timed-out) queries suffice for Unbound to mark the server as non-
responsive for 15 minute interval.
9 Windows OS allows for a more efficient attack requiring less DNS queries.
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3.2 Experimental Evaluation
The Wireshark capture, in Figure 4, that was run on the resolver, demonstrates
the experimental evalutation, i.e., the DNS packets entering/leaving the net-
work card of the resolver. During the course of the experiment the zombie issued
6000 queries10 to the resolver. The spoofer initiates the attack by sending three
spoofed fragments to each IP address except 162.138.183.11. For simplicity, the
capture presents only the packets exchanged between the resolver and the name
server of 404.gov at 162.138.191.23 (by adjusting a corresponding filter in wire-
shark); the complete capture contains queries/responses from other name servers
too. Packets numbered 18-20 are the forged fragments sent by the spoofer, with
sequentially incrementing IP-IDs. Then zombie triggers a DNS request, packet
29. The response from the name server contains two fragments, packets 33 and
34. The first fragment is reassembled with spoofed fragment 18, resulting in a
malformed packet which is discarded by the resolver. The second fragment is
Fig. 4. The wireshark capture of the attack, presenting only the packets exchanged between the
name server 162.183.191.23 and the resolver. As can be observed, after two malformed responses
the resolver refrains from sending further queries to that name server for 15 minutes. Fragmented
packets are coloured in white, DNS requests in black, and reassembled DNS fragments in blue.
discarded after a timeout. In packet 48 the resolver requests a public verification
key of the 404.gov zone. The response contains three fragments 49-51; the first
fragment is reconstructed with the spoofed fragment in packet 20, which also
results in a malformed DNS response and is discarded. Note that this request,
in packet 48, was sent at 19:28. Based on our tests it can be seen that when
Unbound encounters a timeout twice for the same destination IP, it stops send-
ing further packets to that destination for 15 minutes. Indeed, the next packet
that is sent to that IP is packet number 6848, at time 19:43. The same scenario
was observed with IP 162.138.191.11. The queries between 19:28 and 19:43 were
sent only to 162.138.183.11, avoiding 162.138.191.11 and 162.183.191.23. Note
that even if some of the responses (between packets 33 and 49) were valid and
accepted by resolver, e.g., if they were not fragmented, it did not make a dif-
10 Note that our goal was to test the behaviour of the resolver, and to check the
frequency of the queries to non-responsive servers; in real attack, once the IP-ID is
known it is sufficient to issue two queries to mark the server as non-responsive.
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ference, and two timed-out responses in a 15 minute interval were sufficient for
Unbound to stop querying those IP addresses; this fact shows that the success
probability of the attack does not depend on the IP-ID selection mechanism.
3.3 Improved IP Address Randomisation
The attack we presented holds against a specific DNS resolver software, however
we caution that variations of our ideas may apply to other server selection algo-
rithms, and we believe that in the long term best answer to our derandomisation
attacks is to deploy DNSSEC.
In the meanwhile we suggest (1) increasing the number of IP addresses, both
of the name server and of the DNS resolver, e.g., an approach recently proposed
by [35] is to superficially increase the number of IP addresses of the resolver for
its DNS requests by reusing the IP addresses available to the network. Deran-
domising the IP addresses of the resolver seems to be a challenging task for the
attacker; and (2) improving name server selection mechanisms, in particular, and
contrary to the recommendations in [32], the server selection algorithms should
not prefer less latent server and should not introduce differences in computation
of RTT (round trip time).
4 DNS Query (de)Randomisation
In this section we describe two prominent defenses, ‘case toggling’ and random
prefix, which are known to add significant extra entropy to DNS requests and
show simple ways to circumvent them.
‘cASe toGgLiNg’. Dagon et al. [13] present 0x20 encoding for preven-
tion of DNS poisoning. The technique is to randomly toggle the case of letters
of which the domain name consists, and validate them in response. If the do-
main name d contains l(d) alphabetic characters, this increases the space of
identifiers by a factor of X(d) = 2l(d). For example, a typical domain name,
e.g., www.google.com, would increase the attacker’s search space by a factor of
X(www.google.com) = 212. Of course, the factor X depends on the number of
alphabetic characters in the domain name, e.g., X(a9.com) = 24. However, we
believe that the distribution of domain queries with sufficient 0x20 characters, as
reported by Dagon et al., is not indicative of the number of characters in queries
that attackers will try to poison, and hence the impact of 0x20 encoding can be
easily circumvented. In fact, in Kaminsky-style attacks, the query is intention-
ally for a non-existing domain name chosen by the attacker, e.g., the Top Level
Domains (TLDs) such as .com and .uk; indeed the attackers prefer to poison a
response to com rather than to www.google.com. Poisoning com allows the
attacker a control over all subdomains of com (including www.google.com).
Therefore, although 0x20 encoding provides significant extra entropy for long
domain names, the attacker will choose to poison ‘high value’ TLDs, thereby
circumventing the protection of 0x20.
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Random Prefix. Prepending a random prefix to a DNS query11 can ensure
that a sufficiently large DNS query is sent, allowing to apply the 0x20 encoding
on more letters and also making it more difficult for the attacker to guess the
query (and the case of each letter).
The DNS query is composed of subdomains, at most 63 bytes each, sepa-
rated by dots and at the right end the query ends with a top level domain,
e.g., subdomain.subdomain.subdomain.subdomain.TLD. The total number
of characters cannot exceed 255 bytes. So, prepending a random string $1 to
query abc.tld, results in $1.abc.tld and increases the query by the size of $1.
But as we show this protection can also be foiled by the attacker. The at-
tacker that wishes to poison an entry for some top level domain, e.g., com, can
issue a maximal size DNS query, i.e., 255 bytes, consisting of numbers, that will
not allow prepending any more characters: 1-36.1-36.1-36.1-33.com (the ‘1-36’
denotes a string containing all numbers between 1 and 36). As a result, the at-
tacker circumvents the 0x20 protection (which does not apply to numbers) and
further avoids the addition of a random prefix to DNS request (since the query is
already of maximal size). We tested the reduction of query randomisation (and
foiling of 0x20) against Google Public DNS, [36], which supports both defenses,
i.e., 0x20 and random prefix. A slight variation of this attack, see [10], also foils
protection offered by WSEC DNS [16].
Such long queries to top level domains should be restricted or should receive
a special treatment, yet we are not aware of appropriate recommendations in
the relevant documentation.
5 Conclusions
Currently, most DNS resolvers defend against poisoning by validating that each
response contains ‘unpredictable’ identifiers sent in the DNS query, such as the
(16 bit) query ID. Such mechanisms are clearly insufficient to prevent poison-
ing by MitM attackers. A secure standard alternative exists: DNSSEC, which
uses cryptography to achieve verifiable security. Indeed, DNSSEC deployment
is progressing - but, quite slowly. Why so slowly? One reason are significant in-
teroperability and performance concerns; another reason may be the existence
of several ‘patches’, adding more ‘unpredictable’ identifiers. Such ‘patches’ are
trivial to deploy and involve no or negligible overhead, hence, administrators
may prefer to deploy them instead of deploying DNSSEC.
We study all major proposed ‘patches’, and find vulnerabilities in all of them.
Our ‘trap’ and ‘predict’ attacks show that source ports may be disclosed or im-
pacted by network devices such as NAT gateways. We show that the attacker
can also nullify IP address randomisation of standard-conforming resolvers such
as Unbound, forcing the resolver to query a specific name server. We also de-
scribe simple techniques to circumvent the DNS query randomisation via a ran-
dom prefix and 0x20 encoding. We validated our attacks against popular NAT
devices and standard DNS resolver software. Our derandomisation attacks are
11 A random prefix is a variation of the defense proposed in [16].
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deployed ‘sequentially’ in phases, removing the randomisation of each identifier
independently, and eventually strip the DNS request of the entropy offered by
those ‘unpredictability’ fields, exposing the caching DNS resolvers to efficient
poisoning attacks by off-path spoofing adversaries.
We show simple and effective countermeasures to our attacks. However, while
using such ‘patched patches’ is tempting and easy, we believe that our work shows
the importance of basing security on solid, strong foundations, as provided by
DNSSEC, i.e., cryptographic protocols analysed to ensure security even against
MitM attackers.
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A Predict-then-Poison for Port-Preserving NAT
Port-preserving NAT leaves the original source port without modification when
possible. When two clients (with different source IP addresses) send a packet
(each) with the same source port, NAT preserves the port of the first packet
and assigns the next available port to the second packet. As opposed to attack
in Figure 1, the challenge here is to ensure that the query of the local resolver
falls in the range of the ports occupied by the zombie. The coordination between
Fig. 5. The setting and the attacker model that
we consider in all port-prediction attacks. DNS re-
solver is located behind a NAT device along with
a benign client Alice and compromised machine
Zombie. Spoofer Eve is located on the Internet and
her goal is to spoof the DNS response for the vic-
tim domain V.com.
Eve and zombie, when discovering the
external port that will be used for the
DNS query of the resolver is simpler,
since Eve and zombie can coordinate
in advance on the range size and ini-
tial and final indices of the packets
sent by the zombie to the authority
DNS. The steps of the attack are iden-
tical to the steps of the attack in Fig-
ure 1, with one exception: in step (2)
Eve does not need to send Pk packets
and a single packet suffices. The num-
ber k of UDP packets, that the zom-
bie sends, should be sufficiently large,
to increase the probability of the DNS
packet of the local resolver to fall in the occupied range. The probability that the
source port in a DNS query of the resolver will be in the range of ports occupied
by the UDP packets of the zombie is kP , where k is the number of ports occupied
by the zombie, and P is the total number of ports.
To evade detection12 part of the attack can be carried out by the puppets,
which can be used to make k queries to the local resolver, to occupy sufficiently
large range of ports, causing the query of the local resolver to be mapped to a
predictable port.
12 In order to maintain control over a zombie the attacker would prefer to reduce the
usage of the zombie to minimum, and to use puppets when possible.
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Fig. 6. DNS trap-then-poison attack using globally random ports allocation, for configuration in
Figure 5.
B DNSSEC Deployment
DNSSEC ensures stronger security guarantees, however, its deployment remains
to be seen due to the significant changes that it introduces to the current DNS
infrastructure. In particular, DNSSEC requires cooperation and support by both
the resolver and authoritative servers, which is a significant overhaul. DNSSEC
introduces new resource records, e.g., signatures, which require specialised soft-
ware for their generation, and also require changes to the zone file. Further-
more, there may be a reduced motivation to adop DNSSEC, as there are many
non-conforming intermediate Internet devices, which discard fragmented traffic
(DNSSEC enabled responses are large and often get fragmented), or large UDP
packet. Many legacy proxy resolvers strip DNSSEC resource records from the
DNS responses, rendering the DNS resolvers exposed to poisoning attacks.
Indeed recent studies [37,38,39,9] show that only about 0.02% of the zones
have, so far, set up DNSSEC resource records; this indicates that the vast ma-
jority of organisations with an Internet presence are still vulnerable to attacks,
e.g., [40]. A recent survey of edu names, [39], shows that about 1% are signed.
The study’s results also reveal that some fundamental capabilities required for
adoption of DNSSEC in DNS resolvers, e.g., support of queries over TCP and
support of EDNS0 [41], are not widely deployed.
The delay in deployment of the defenses against MitM adversaries, and the
continuing attacks on DNS infrastructure, e.g., AT&T, Comcast and Rolling-
stone [42,43,44,40], motivates inspection of the ‘easy-to-deploy’ defenses, such as
port randomisation.
